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FAIR USE IN SAYRE V. MOORE: A REPLY TO 
ORACLE 
Ned Snow* 
The Supreme Court is now considering the case of Google LLC v. Or-
acle America, Inc. Oracle has argued that Google infringed its copyright 
in computer software, but a jury found that Google’s use was not infringing 
under the fair use doctrine. The Federal Circuit reversed the jury verdict 
under a de novo standard of review. I have argued that this reversal violates 
the Seventh Amendment.  
Seventh Amendment rights depend on whether an issue would have 
been decided by a jury in English law courts during the late 1700s. My 
argument is that in the 1785 English case of Sayre v. Moore, the court re-
quired a jury to decide an issue that is analogous to fair use, so the Seventh 
Amendment applies to Google’s jury verdict. But some have criticized my 
interpretation of Sayre, construing it instead to be about other copyright 
doctrines, such as the fact-expression dichotomy or independent creation. 
This Essay responds to those criticisms. It analyzes the text of the Sayre 
opinion and makes observations based on that analysis. The Essay con-
cludes that the issue put to the jury in Sayre was closely analogous to the 
modern issue of fair use. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court will be deciding a copyright case this term, Google 
LLC v. Oracle America, Inc, which concerns Google’s use of software that Ora-
cle holds a copyright in. A jury found for Google on the issue of fair use, and the 
Federal Circuit reversed that verdict under a de novo standard of review.1 Re-
cently I wrote an article and submitted an amici brief arguing that the Federal 
Circuit’s reversal violated the Seventh Amendment.2  
Since I wrote the article, some have challenged my interpretation of a key 
case in the argument—Sayre v. Moore.3 Sayre is a 1785 English case in which a 
 
 * Ray Taylor Fair Professor of Law, University of South Carolina. A draft of this Essay was presented 
at the Chicago Kent College of Law, 2020 Supreme Court IP Review: Preview of Google v. Oracle. 
 1. Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google LLC, 886 F.3d 1179 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 2. Ned Snow, Who Decides Fair Use—Judge or Jury?, 94  WASH. L. REV. 275 (2019); Brief of Amici 
Curiae Civ Pro, IP & Legal History Professors in support of Petitioner, Google LLC v. Oracle Am., Inc., No. 18-
956 (Jan. 7, 2020), https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/18/18-956/127739/20200107121121412_39 
073%20pdf%20Snow.pdf [https://perma.cc/B7G3-GMWN]. 
 3. (1785) 102 Eng. Rep. 138, 139–40 n.(b); 1 East 358, 361–62.  
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jury sitting in a court of law decided an issue closely analogous to fair use. This 
conclusion is crucial to my Seventh Amendment argument because the constitu-
tional requirement for deference to a jury verdict depends on whether a jury 
would have heard the issue (or an analogous one) in an English court of law at 
the time of the Seventh Amendment.4 Some, however, have cast doubt on my 
interpretation. They have suggested that the jury issue in Sayre did not concern 
fair use, but rather dealt with an issue more closely akin to the fact-expression 
dichotomy,5 or alternatively, an issue about whether the defendant did in fact 
copy from the plaintiff’s work.6 Respecting these contrary interpretations, I now 
further analyze the reasoning of Sayre to support my interpretation that the issue 
in Sayre is analogous to the modern doctrine of fair use. 
Part I sets forth the text of the legal reasoning in Sayre v. Moore. Part II 
provides a textual analysis of that reasoning. Part III makes observations based 
on the entire passage and the context of the time period. 
I. THE OPINION 
The issue in Sayre concerned whether a defendant, who had copied sea 
charts of the plaintiff, had infringed the plaintiff’s copyright. The case arose in a 
court of law, and the opinion was written by Lord Mansfield. The entirety of 
Mansfield’s analysis consists of the fifteen sentences quoted below. These sen-
tences, however, do not include the evidence of the case which is recited above 
the analysis in the opinion. For ease of reference, I have numbered each sentence: 
 
[1] The rule of decision in this case is a matter of great consequence to 
the country.  
[2] In deciding it we must take care to guard against two extremes 
equally prejudicial; the one, that men of ability, who have employed 
their time for the service of the community, may not be deprived of 
their just merits, and the reward of their ingenuity and labour; the other, 
that the world may not be deprived of improvements, nor the progress 
of the arts be retarded.  
[3] The Act that secures copy-right to authors guards against the piracy 
of the words and sentiments; but it does not prohibit writing on the 
same subject.  
[4] As in the case of histories and dictionaries: in the first, a man may 
give a relation of the same facts, and in the same order of time; in the 
latter an interpretation is given of the identical same words.  
 
 4. See Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 US. 340, 347‒48 (1998). 
 5. See Justin Hughes, The Respective Role of Judges and Juries in Fair Use, 58 HOUS. L. REV. 5‒7 (forth-
coming 2020). 
 6. See Supplemental Brief of Respondent at 9, Google LLC v. Oracle Am., Inc., No 18-956 (Aug. 7, 
2020), https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/18/18-956/149667/20200807132108693_2020.08.07%20Or-
acle%20Supplemental%20Brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/JNB9-LLPF] (“[T]he sole question the court identified for 
the jury was whether the substantial similarity between maps was due to copying, versus simply reflecting the 
same geographic elements that anyone is free to document.”). 
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[5] In all these cases the question of fact to come before a jury is, 
whether the alteration be colourable or not?  
[6] there must be such a similitude as to make it probable and reason-
able to suppose that one is a transcript of the other, and nothing more 
than a transcript.  
[7] So in the case of prints, no doubt different men may take engravings 
from the same picture.  
[8] The same principle holds with regard to charts; whoever has it in 
his intention to publish a chart may take advantage of all prior publi-
cations.  
[9] There is no monopoly of the subject here, any more than in the 
other instances; but upon any question of this nature the jury will de-
cide whether it be a servile imitation or not.  
[10] If an erroneous chart be made, God forbid it should not be cor-
rected even in a small degree, if it thereby become more serviceable 
and useful for the purposes to which it is applied.  
[11] But here you are told, that there are various and very material al-
terations.  
[12] This chart of the plaintiffs’ is upon a wrong principle, inapplicable 
to navigation.  
[13] The defendant therefore has been correcting errors, and not ser-
vilely copying.  
[14] If you think so, you will find for the defendant; if you think it is a 
mere servile imitation, and pirated from the other, you will find for the 
plaintiffs. 
[15] Verdict for the defendant.7 
II. TEXTUAL ANALYSIS 
Mansfield starts broad. He sets forth the importance of the case in Sen-
tences 1 and 2, explaining that this case concerns a tension between providing a 
“reward” to “men of ability” for their “just merits” and allowing for “improve-
ments” that would benefit “the world” and further “the progress of the arts.”8 In 
other words, he identifies a tension between enforcing the copyright so as to re-
ward authors for their labor and allowing others to improve upon existing works 
so as to further societal progress.  
Although these sentences do not speak directly to whether the case con-
cerns fair use, it is notable that fair use does raise this tension that Mansfield 
identifies (as does the fact-expression doctrine). Notably, though, this tension 
would not be present if the issue of the case concerned whether the defendant 
had in fact copied from the plaintiff. The issue of whether copying actually oc-
curred does not raise concern over protecting “improvements” on existing works. 
 
 7. (1785) 102 Eng. Rep. 138, 140 n.(b). 
 8. Id. 
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Hence, Sentence 2 appears inconsistent with an interpretation suggesting that the 
case deals with whether copying occurred. 
In Sentence 3, Mansfield begins reciting the law. He recounts a principle 
with which no one would disagree: the Act’s prohibition of piracy does not pre-
vent two people from independently writing on the same subject. Today we 
would label this principle independent creation.  
Mansfield continues this line of thought in Sentence 4. He gives two exam-
ples of independent creation: independently created histories and independently 
created dictionaries. Two men might write historical accounts using the same 
facts and order of events, and they may also write dictionaries that define the 
same set of words. There is no doubt that these examples illustrate independent 
creation. 
In Sentence 5, Mansfield poses the question that would come before a jury 
in these sorts of independent-creation cases: “whether the alteration be coloura-
ble or not.” Notably, the meaning of colourable here is deceptive or specious—
an older meaning in the law.9 With this understanding, we see that in these inde-
pendent-creation cases, the jury decides whether a second author has in fact made 
his own creation or, alternatively, has made some specious changes to the first 
author’s work so as to make it look like it is his own independent creation. 
I pause here to ask a question. Why is Mansfield talking about independent 
creation at all? The opinion’s recitation of evidence indicates that the defendant 
was not arguing independent creation. Specifically, in reciting the evidence be-
fore the court, the opinion states: “It appeared in evidence that the defendant had 
taken the body of his publication from the work of the plaintiffs, but that he had 
made many alterations and improvements thereupon.”10 Likewise, a witness for 
the defendant had testified: “That there were very material errors in the plaintiffs’ 
maps. . . . That most of these, as well as errors in the foundings, were corrected 
by the defendant.”11 Simply put, this case could not have been about whether 
copying actually occurred. Rather, it was about whether the defendant made im-
provements that would suggest against a finding of piracy. Why, then, is Mans-
field bringing up the issue of determining whether copying had occurred, i.e., 
independent creation? 
The answer is that Mansfield begins by reciting a principle with which eve-
ryone agrees (independent creation), along with its corresponding jury issue 
(whether a defendant made specious alterations) in order to derive a related but 
distinct legal principle. He begins his move into this distinct legal principle in 
Sentence 6. 
At first glance, Sentence 6 seems to straightforwardly answer the question 
posed in Sentence 5: the way to discern between an independent creation and a 
mere specious alteration is to identify “such a similitude” between the two works 
at issue that the defendant’s must be a “transcript” of the plaintiff’s. But then 
 
 9. Colourable, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE (entry 2.a) (“Intended to deceive or to conceal a 
true purpose; fraudulent; feigned, pretended, spurious.”). 
 10. (1785) 102 Eng. Rep. 138, 139 n.(b).  
 11. Id. at 140 n.(b). 
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Mansfield adds a rather telling clause at the end of Sentence 6: “and nothing 
more than a transcript.”12 This “nothing more” clause is puzzling, for Mansfield 
has set up that clause so that it will introduce an idea that contrasts with creating 
a similar transcript. Given that independent creation is the doctrine that Mans-
field has taught in the prior three sentences, we would expect Mansfield at this 
point in Sentence 6 to refer to an independent creation as the contrasting alterna-
tive to works that are of “such a similitude.” Yet if the clause were describing an 
independent creation, it would be describing how a second work would be less 
than a mere transcript. Only if the second work were less than a transcript would 
the two copies lack sufficient similarity, thereby implying that the second work 
is an independent creation. Mansfield goes the opposite direction. He gives as a 
contrast to an infringing transcript the possibility of something “more” being 
added to the transcript. The word more implies that the second work constitutes 
the transcript plus something else. Putting this together, we see that Mansfield is 
suggesting that in contrast to copying that is an infringement, copying that adds 
something else would not be infringing. Stated differently, the nothing-more 
clause does not contrast with the act of copying, but rather, with the ultimate 
conclusion of infringement. Mansfield is telling us that adding more to the tran-
script copy is not infringement. 
Sentence 7 continues this principle that Mansfield introduces in the noth-
ing-more clause by provides validating examples. This continuation of thought 
is apparent as he starts Sentence 7 by stating, “So in the case of prints,” which 
indicates that he is now applying the principle in Sentence 6 to an example in-
volving prints. That example is informative: “different men may take engravings 
from the same picture.”13 Men may copy the expression (not merely the fact) of 
a picture to create their own engravings of the picture. Plainly, this example is 
intended to illustrate the case in which infringement would not occur, or in the 
words of Sentence 6, where a copy constitutes “more than a transcript.” The rea-
son, then, that men can take expression from an existing picture is because the 
process of engraving the picture requires them to add something more to the pic-
ture.  
Perhaps, though, Mansfield is instead illustrating that two men may create 
their similar engravings independently without infringing, even though they 
share the same source. That is to say, could Mansfield’s example in Sentence 7 
be returning us to independent creation? The answer lies in Sentence 8. There, 
Mansfield explains that he is now applying “[t]he same principle” from Sentence 
7 to the sort of expression under consideration in the case before him, sea charts. 
He applies that same principle by declaring that whoever intends to create a chart 
may “take advantage of all prior publications.”14 In other words, people may 
copy existing works without infringing. Sentence 8 thus implies that the principle 
discussed in Sentence 7 could not be an independent creation. In Sentence 7, 
Mansfield must be talking about copying the prior expression (i.e., the picture).  
 
 12. Id. (emphasis added). 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
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Sentence 8 is further notable because it does not suggest that a person must 
copy only unprotected portions of a prior publication. Mansfield provides no 
qualification that would exclude copying expression. Therefore, especially when 
viewed in conjunction with copying a picture (i.e., expression) in Sentence 7, 
Sentence 8 does not appear to suggest the fact-expression dichotomy.  
In Sentence 9, Mansfield begins by reciting the well-established principle 
that one cannot monopolize a subject matter. From this premise, one might ex-
pect Mansfield to explain independent creation. But once again, he goes a differ-
ent direction. He proceeds to explain that “the jury will decide whether [the de-
fendant’s copying] be a servile imitation or not.”15 The meaning for servile here 
is “slavish” or “unintelligently close to the . . . original,” as defined in the Oxford 
English Dictionary.16 The jury’s inquiry, then, is not into whether copying oc-
curred, but rather, it is into whether copying occurred in a slavish manner. This 
is not an independent-creation inquiry. Moreover, Sentence 9 implies that non-
slavish copying would not be infringing. Copying that involves intelligent 
thought, resulting in a work that is not too close to the original, would seem per-
missible under the logic of Sentence 9. 
In Sentence 10, Mansfield observes value in the sort of use that the defend-
ant has alleged—specifically, the correction of mistakes on a faulty sea chart. 
This observation of Mansfield is consonant with the first factor of the modern 
fair use test, which also evaluates the value of the defendant’s use.17 Sentences 
11, 12, and 13 set forth the argument of the defendant that the jury is to consider. 
That argument is that the defendant made “various and very material alterations” 
(Sentence 11); that the plaintiff’s charts do not allow for proper navigation (Sen-
tence 12); and that the defendant was correcting errors in those charts rather than 
slavishly copying (Sentence 13).18 This argument sounds very much like ele-
ments in a modern fair use argument. It touches on the purpose of the defendant’s 
use (correcting errors), the transformative nature of the use (making various and 
material alterations), and arguably the nature of the plaintiff’s work (faulty for 
navigation).19 Tellingly, these Sentences do not suggest a principle that would 
recognize less copyright protection in factual information. Nor do they concern 
independent creation. Taken together, Sentences 10-13 represent the analogue to 
the modern fair use doctrine. 
In Sentence 14, Mansfield charges the members of the jury that if they 
“think so,” they should find for the defendant.20 Importantly, “think so” refers to 
the defendant’s arguments set forth in Sentences 11-13. Those arguments, and 
only those arguments, are the ones that determine whether the defendant should 
 
 15. Id. 
 16. Servile, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE (entry 6) (“Of imitation (esp. in literature and art), 
translation, etc.: unintelligently close to the exemplar or original; ‘slavish’. Hence of a person as agent.”). 
 17. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (examining “the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use 
is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes”). 
 18. (1785) 102 Eng. Rep. 138, 140 n.(b). 
 19. See 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
 20. (1785) 102 Eng. Rep. 138, 140 n.(b). 
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be held liable for copying. And as mentioned above, those arguments are closely 
akin to the sort that we would find in today’s fair use doctrine. 
The last point to note from Mansfield’s opinion arises in Sentences 14 and 
3. Sentence 14 indicates that if the jury does not accept the defendant’s argu-
ments in Sentences 11-13, then that conclusion means the defendant’s work is 
“pirated.”21 In other words, if the use is not permissibly fair, it is infringing. 
Keeping this in mind, recall that Sentence 3 sets forth the unremarkable propo-
sition that the Act protects against “piracy.” Read together, then, Sentences 14 
and 3 make a subtle but important point: the copyright doctrines discussed be-
tween Sentences 3 and 14 define whether a defendant has “pirated” a work in 
violation of the Act. This point matters a lot. It means that the argument that the 
jury considers in Sentences 11-13 determines whether a legal right has been in-
fringed. That is, the fair use principles are defining the legal right. So not only 
does Mansfield send the issue to the jury, but he calls out the fact that the issue 
determines infringement of a legal right. Put more bluntly, if Sayre is indeed a 
fair use case (or its analogue), Sayre satisfies the Seventh Amendment historical 
test.  
III. OBSERVATIONS 
We thus observe that Mansfield begins with a principle that is undeniable—
i.e., independent creation is not a piracy—and ends with a principle that is per-
haps less established at the time—i.e., improvements on a plaintiff’s work may 
not be a piracy. Starting with independent creation, he moves to similarity that 
implies copying, and then transitions to a discussion about copying that adds 
something valuable to the original. He points out that both principles call for a 
jury to make a judgment about alterations: the independent-creation principle 
calls for a judgment about whether alterations are specious, and the non-infring-
ing-improvement principle calls for a judgment about whether alterations are 
material. In so many words, he is drawing on independent creation to arrive at a 
principle that recognizes non-infringement based on a defendant’s use. 
We also observe that in the second half of the opinion, when Mansfield is 
applying the law to the facts, he engages in a fair use sort of analysis. The first 
factor of the modern fair use doctrine examines “the purpose and character” of a 
defendant’s use.22 Similarly, Mansfield calls for an examination of whether a 
defendant’s use would be “more serviceable and useful” (Sentence 10).23 Fur-
thermore, the first fair use factor requires consideration of whether a defendant’s 
use “adds something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering 
the first with new expression, meaning, or message.”24 Mansfield likewise sug-
gests that adding something more to the original, by correcting errors, would not 
be infringing (Sentences 6-9). In that regard, he asks the jury to consider whether 
 
 21. Id. 
 22. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(1). 
 23. (1785) 102 Eng. Rep. 138, 140 n.(b). 
 24. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994). 
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the defendant made “various and very material alterations” to the original 
work.25 In short, Mansfield’s analysis posits that a defendant’s copying of the 
plaintiff’s work could be non-infringing depending on the sort of use made. That 
sounds a lot like fair use.  
Notably, nowhere in the opinion does Mansfield suggest that sea charts re-
ceive less protection because of their factual nature. Although he states that 
“[t]here is no monopoly of the subject here” (Sentence 9),26 he never connects 
that statement to the factual nature of the charts. There is no mention of the 
work’s factual nature as a basis for implying less protection or permissible cop-
ying. Yet even if we were to construe this statement to mean that the factual 
nature of the charts suggests against infringement, this construction supports the 
fair use analysis. The second factor of the modern fair use doctrine examines the 
nature of the copyrighted work, including whether that work is more factual than 
creative.27 Hence, if Mansfield were suggesting that the sea charts should receive 
less protection because they are factual, this falls in line with fair use. 
In the end, Mansfield does not treat this case as turning on the factual nature 
of the sea charts. Yet why not? Sea charts are mostly factual, so the fact-expres-
sion dichotomy would seem to be the doctrine that he should have employed. 
Indeed, it is difficult not to think of Sayre as a fact-expression case.28 But this is 
not a modern case. This is a 1785 case. At that time, copyright gained legitimacy 
from Locke’s labor-desert theory. Indeed, Mansfield recites that theory in Sen-
tence 2: “men of ability” who have “employed their time” should “not be de-
prived of their just merits” or “the reward of their ingenuity and labour.”29 To be 
sure, Lockean theory is on the plaintiff’s side of the Sayre lawsuit. This means 
that the strength of the plaintiff’s copyright does not depend on creativity (as it 
would today under Feist) as much as it does sweat of the brow. In other words, 
the factual nature of the plaintiff’s subject matter does not significantly weaken 
the copyright protection (and perhaps not even at all)—unlike it would under 
modern precedent.30 Therefore, it is unsurprising that Mansfield does not rely on 
the factual nature of sea charts to determine whether the defendant infringed. 
Instead, he relies on the merits of the defendant’s use—what today we call fair 
use. 
CONCLUSION 
Sayre v. Moore applies principles of the modern fair use doctrine to the 
facts of the case. It is not a case that applies the fact-expression dichotomy or the 
 
 25. (1785) 102 Eng. Rep. 138, 140 n.(b). 
 26. Id. 
 27. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (examining “the nature of the copyrighted work”); Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586. 
 28. See Feist Pub’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 344 (1991). 
 29. (1785) 102 Eng. Rep. 138, 140 n.(b). 
 30. This conclusion draws further support from the 1790 Copyright Act, which lists three categories of 
protectable works: maps, charts, and books. See Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (amended 1831). The 
former two categories would receive only thin copyright protection under modern precedent. See Feist, 499 U.S. 
at 344‒45, 349. 
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independent creation doctrine to the facts. The jury was not charged to evaluate 
whether the defendant used unprotected factual elements of the plaintiff’s sea 
charts. Nor was the jury charged to consider whether the defendant actually cop-
ied those charts. Instead, Mansfield charged the jury to consider the value of the 
defendant’s use—correcting errors in faulty sea charts—to determine whether 
infringement occurred. That is the only issue that the jury considered. And that 
is fair use.31 
 
 
 31. I respond to three additional points raised against my position. First, evidence outside the case suggests 
that Mansfield employed a “special jury”—a group of merchants—in Sayre. See Hughes, supra note 5, at 6 
(suggesting that the special jury might detract from a Seventh Amendment argument). Does this fact affect the 
Seventh Amendment analysis? Professors William Luneburg and Mark Nordenberg have concluded that this fact 
should not affect the analysis. See William V. Luneburg & Mark A. Nordenberg, Specially Qualified Juries and 
Expert Nonjury Tribunals: Alternatives for Coping with the Complexities of Modern Civil Litigation, 67 VA. L. 
REV. 887, 903 (1981). In their insightful article, they explain: “the special jury was an acceptable form of jury at 
common law and would, therefore, meet the seventh amendment’s historical test.” Id. at 903‒04. They point out 
that in 1730, Parliament passed a statute allowing any litigant in a criminal or civil case to request a special jury. 
Id. Modern courts have not indicated that a special jury used in the past would be insufficient to trigger a jury 
right under the Seventh Amendment today. 
Second, Professor Hughes calls attention to a statement by the Lord Chancellor in Gyles v. Wilcox, (1740) 26 
Eng. Rep. 489; 2 Atk. 141. There, a defendant had copied significant portions of a law book and the Lord Chan-
cellor hearing the case in equity refused to send the “factual” issues to a jury. Despite this case having arisen in 
equity, Professor Hughes cited this as evidence against the argument that fair use was a legal issue to be tried by 
a jury in law courts. Hughes explained that the case “shows only one of England’s most learned jurists opining 
that with a copyright infringement case, even in the face of a fair abridgment defense and a request from defend-
ant’s counsel, ‘[t]he court [wa]s not under an indispensable obligation to send all facts to a jury.’” Hughes, supra 
note 5, at 11 (quoting Gyles, 2 Atk. 141 at 490–91). Respectfully, I disagree that this statement in Gyles, which 
arose in an equitable proceeding, is relevant to the historical test for the Seventh Amendment. The Lord Chan-
cellor’s opinion that a judge sitting in equity should decide an issue (rather than send it to a jury) does not suggest 
that a judge sitting in a court of law should do likewise. Indeed, if anything, the Lord Chancellor’s characteriza-
tion of the issue as factual in nature suggests the opposite conclusion—that if the issue had arisen in a law court, 
the jury would have needed to decide it. 
Third, Oracle has raised doubt over whether the jury actually decided the infringement issue of fair abridgment 
in the case of Roworth v. Wilkes, (1807) 170 Eng. Rep. 889; 1 Camp. 94. Supplemental Brief of Respondent, at 
9, Google LLC v. Oracle Am., Inc., No 18-956 (Aug. 7, 2020). As I explained in my earlier article, the case itself 
does not speak to the issue. Snow, supra note 2, at 296 n.157. Instead, the English case of Campbell v. Scott, 
(1842) 59 Eng. Rep. 784, 787; 11 Sim. 31, 40., provides the answer:  
Roworth v. Wilkes was a case in which 75 pages of a treatise consisting of 118 pages were taken and inserted 
in a very voluminous work . . . and, although the matter taken formed but a very small proportion of the 
work into which it was introduced, the jury found for the Plaintiff, who was the author of the treatise. 
Campbell thus states that in Roworth, “the jury found for the Plaintiff,” or in other words, the jury decided the 
infringement issue. 
